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I. BACKGROUND
One of the most significant characteristics of the Argentinian political
system of the past years has been the weak role played by the political parties. This
has come in the face of other strong political actors of a corporate nature, such as
the unions and businesses,. used to acting in the political system. This strange
phenomenon could be fundamental in explaining the struggle that has been taking
place in the Argentinian political arena post 1983. It could explain the failure to
complete joint strategies, and could even be the reason behind the blocking of
various initiatives to modernize purely instrumental aspects of the political system
within its existing structure. The weakness of the political parties themselves,
together with an unusual political culture, moved these parties further away from the
centre of the political system and introduced the movementist logic into the picture.
At Peronism's self-proclamation as the movement capable of uniting the popular
identities en masse, there followed a sense of radicalism similar to that which
around 1985 lit up the idea of the "third historical movement", able to. guarantee a
radical government through to the end of the century.
1. Characteristics of the Alfonsín government.
When Raul Alfonsín ascended to the presidency in December 1983, the
past half century of Argentinian political history presented itself as an obstacle to be
buried once and for all. The elimination of authoritarianism and the proscription of
parties, the establishment of an unimposed and greatly changed political r6gime,
the respect for human rights, and the modernisation of political society all formed
the platform on which the new politics would be built.
President Alfonsín's obsession coincided perfectly with the old radical
tradition of respect for the constitution and  for individual rights. The scrupulousness
with which he observed the rules of the game made him the first Argentinian
President to serve  his term in office, respecting the autonomy of the provinces that
lay within the boundaries of the federal government's jurisdiction  without using
Article Six of the Constitution, so often employed by his predecessors to allow 'the
Federal government to intervene in the provinces. In a similar vein, in 1987 he
renewed the posts of provincial governor by democratic election, for the first time
since 1962. The four elections, held biannually beginning in 1983, were of an
ordered, regularity that had been nonexistent since that unusual first period of
Paronism (19461955). Finally, the termination of his six year old presidential term,
and his substitution by another, democratically elected, president, was something
that had not occurred since 1928. It could even be said that this was hitherto
unheard of in Argentina under the law of universal suffrage, if we take into account
the fact that the presidential replacement was selected from among candidates of
decidedly, different political affiliations.
In the. face of these undeniable and well defined successes, the Raul
Alfonsín government appears sketchy with regards to setting in motion policies to
combat the problem derived from the above character of the Argentinian political
system. Chronologically there are four clearly defined periods in the Alfonsín
government, each of these essentially defined by the electoral periods: 1983-85,
1985-87, 1987-89, and the last, or "transitory" period from May to July 1989. One
can also distinguish at least four general thematic blocks.
The first of these is the military issue, closely linked with that of human
rights. Immediately after ascending to the presidency, Raul Alfonsín, by way of the
attorney general, prosecuted the members of the three military juntas of the
"Proceso", (1976-1983) led respectively by Generals Videla, Viola and Galtieri.
They were charged with having violated human rights and their responsibilities in
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands affair. The conviction of the members of these three
military juntas, who received varying prison sentences, was seen as a milestone in
civil-military relations in Latin America. Nonetheless, this sentencing did not mean
that the military was to be controlled from then on by the government. Corporate
pressure I came from the various branches of the Armed Forces, and from several
institutions in the public sector,. embodied by the human rights organisations, which
were particularly active in 1982-83 and which desired considerable extension of the
military's responsibilities for the protection of human rights, and from right wing
groups. All of the above, combined with an extremely active public opinion and a
lack of decisiveness on the part of the government, led to a state of ambiguity and
of almost permanent questioning of the Armed Forces. The laws of "punto final" and
"obediencia debida",. together with the events of the Easter Week of 1987, of the
Monte Caseros episode and, finally, of Villa Martelli, appeared as unconnected
juridical and political matters that served only to emphasise the general
incompetence of the Executive branch. This incompetence seemed to be spilling
over, and appeared unable to deal with crisis or to retake the initiative of the first
moments of the presidential term.
Union relations were defined by the attempts of the Unión Cívica Radical
(UCR) to remodel, through the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), the
role that the unions had been playing in Argentina since 1955 (1). In a sense, the
question was one of relocating the unions within the Argentinian political system
and establishing more modern guidelines. The proposed law concerning the
restructuring of the unions, sent to Congress by the Executive branch, was rejected
by the former, owing to the influence of the provinces (governed mainly by
Peronists) within the Senate. Dissention within the Peronist camp, emphasised by
the 1985 legislative elections, in which the Peronist family showed itself to be
divided between the Partido Justicialista and the Frejuli (Movement of October
17th), suggested in the radical headquarters the idea of,. provoking discord among
the Justicialists with the aim of accelerating the process of disintegration, and thus
achieving the desired effect with regards the aforementioned legislative-" initiative.
In this sense, the appointment of the union-leader Alderete was, for the Ministerio
de Trabajo, an operation destined to destabilize union power.
1987 found Justicialism completely reorganised; the CGT continued to
submit the UCR government to relentless union pressure, declaring thirteen general
strikes in six years, and Alderete continued to be a token figure. All of the Radicals'
hopes to the contrary could do . nothing to hinder the renovation of the Justicialist
Party, the renovation being led by Antonio Cafiero, elected governer of the province
of Buenos Aires in 1987. The study carried out by the UCR concluded that
Peronism would "commit political suicide" once their supposedly less acceptable
figures rose to prominence. This strategy failed when Cafiero lost the nomination for
the Peronist candidate to the presidency, which went instead to Carlos Menem,
governor of La Rioja, and someone who could count on the support of the more
established sectors of Justicialism, such as the more traditionally unionist areas.
The handling of the economic question arose as one of the key issues of
the Alfonsín government. The situation was one of a productive capability seriously
damaged by the neoliberal economic policies carried out under the "Proceso". The
country found itself with a national debt so large that it inhibited further investment in
Argentina and dramatically limited the export funds available for the paying off of
this debt, and with inflationary tendencies that were a preview of the fall of the
system into the spiral of hyperinflation. The state was in a position of crisis, and
virtual bankruptcy. The formula used to carry out the economic policy was based
partly on shock tactics and partly on a notable lack of both political (within
Congress) and economical (among the unions and businessmen) instruments for
reaching consensus. The outstanding instrument of economic policy was the Austral
Plan (June 1985). The failure of this plan was largely caused by the impossibility of
carrying out any real structural reforms, and by the inconsistency of the government
in following its course of action with regards the various pressures upon it. This was
aggravated by the fact that this was not the moment to carry out their chosen
option, even if it had been blindly accepted by the Executive branch. Its method
consisted once again, with few exceptions, of putting into action, three years later,
another Spring Plan, which failed this time due to the same lack of conviction on the
part of its creators. The poor state of the economy exploded dramatically in the first
months of 1989, considerably affecting the outcome of the presidential elections. In
barely three months, the number of australs in the dollar had increased five fold,
and according to official figures, inflation rose to 33.4% for the month of April. This
was the highest it had been since March of 1976, the month in which a military coup
was carried out against the government of "Isabelita",Per6n.
Political reform became an obsession with President Alfonsín as a way to
modernize a regime that had changed little from its 1853 constitutional definition. It
was obvious that the old constitution was, in more ways than one, no longer
adequate: from the very language in which it was written; to its restriction of the
number of ministers to eight; from its indirect form of presidential election; to (as we
shall see later) the required Roman-Catholic affiliation of the President and
Vice-President, among others. It was equally inadequate in more strictly political
terms: in the duration of the presidential term; in the biannual renewal by halves of
the House of Deputies and the triannual renewal of the third part of the Senate; in
the more controversial inexistence of the figure of Prime Minister, whose main role
would be as chief of public administration; and finally, in the creation of a Social
Economic Council (3). This and the clear difference between the reformist doctrine
of President Alfonsín and the reality of the political regime, brought about the
necessity of a constitutional reform. There were two main ideas upon which this
reality rested: the inevitable carrying out of an agreed upon constitutional reform,
and the necessity of the creation of a Council for the Consolidation of Democracy, in
charge of developing theoretical elements of the political debate. The Radical
electoral upset of 1987, and the aformentioned replacement by Carlos Menem of
Antonio Cafiero as leader of the Justicialist Party, put an end to hopes of
reconciliation, especially now that important Peronist sectors saw the constitutional
reform as one more pawn in the hegemonic strategy of Alfonsinism, and were
convinced that it was being used to hide the real motives of the radical leader,
which revolved around the possibility of his reelection.
2. The Issue of the Consolidation gf Democracy
The government that emerged after the recovery of democratic liberties in
the 1983 elections saw its role defined by a constant tension that appeared when
the demand for instant action, brought about by the serious economic and
political-military crisis, added itself to the necessity of installing a new political
system. This became even more complicated when it was Alfonsín himself,
surrounded by the charismatic nature of his leadership, who acted not only to
legitimise the political issues but also to overcome conflicts. The administration of
the continual crisis, within, highly personal and scarcely agreed limits, made difficult
the creation of an "institutional system capable of being changed into a privileged
area for exchanges among political actors" and, as such, greatly complicated the
possibility of complete consolidation (4).
Another central question facing democratic regimes, and one upon which
their very survival depends, is the ability that their institutions should have to
respond to social demands. This is one of the definitive differences between
democracies and authoritocracies, the objective of the latter being not to respond to
demands, but to repress them. Nonetheless, the Argentinian society is one
impregnated by a corporativism in which the political parties are not the only focus
of the political structure of the social institutions (5). As such, the political parties do
not act efficiently as intermediaries. Social demands are only dealt with quickly in
moments of grave crisis, or at times when the corporations feel that there may be
something to be gained by swift action. In short, the social dislocation and the
resulting weight of the corporate powers are linked to the way in which politics are
run in Argentina, and which even today affect both majority and minority politics.
Raul Alfonsín's insistence on the carrying out of the stipulated periodical
elections during his term, this being something frequently violated in previous times,
would therefore seem somewhat inadequate. It could even, at the slightest
presidential alteration in the elections, restrict the success of the Argentinian
political transition (6). Although presidential change is of Vital importance in
assuring the regulated development of the political regime, it does not in itself
guarantee either the safety or the regular functioning of the system. In a way, the
cyclical pattern fulfills, as far as governmental change is concerned, an essential
function in the selection of political elites. Nonetheless, this model, outlined by
several political scientists for the study of stable democracies in Latin America, and
one that implies both social change and economic and social decentralization, could
prove to be useful (7).
On another level, the analysis of political institutions and sociocultural and
socioeconomic variables, presents itself as a way of investigating the problem of
consolidation (8): the persistence of a strongly authoritarian political culture; the
presence of an intense socioeconomic crisis, provoked equally by internal and
external factors; and the questioning of the efficacy of the political institutions in
Argentina, raise doubts about the consolidation of the democratic system, inspite of
the comparative successes.
However, another very different question is that of the decomposition of
Argentinian democracy. The elements that appear in the classic literature on the
processes of the breakdown of democracies (9), are present in Argentina today only
with regards the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. From an observation of
the remaining elements it could be inferred that the system is not, for the moment,
threatened by fracture or regressions: the legitimacy of the regime is reinforced
periodically at the ballot box and by placing the power of decision within the legal
framework; the imperfect two party system ensures the governability of the houses,
in which the Peronist party had the absolute majority after the legislative elections of
May 1989, including within in the massive opposition that aligned itself in what is
considered the "legal opposition" and which rejects the traditional search for military
support; the stability of the governors under Raul Alfonsín has insured against
political crisis and loss of power, as was shown after the electoral overturning of his
party; finally, violence, the cause of the previous stages of deterioration, does not
appear to be present in an organised form, either against the state, or as
"legitimate" violence against the enemies of the state.
3. Is Democracy Simply Elections?
The influence of Robert Dahl (10) on many of the studies of the processes
of democratization in Latin America in the eighties, has implied that in the majority
of cases, and following the traditional process of the formation of liberal
democracies (poliarchies), the new democracies should also have to pass through
two lines of development: pluralist competence and political participation. This set
the trend for the debate on the theory of democracy, which divided those who were
in favour of democracy without adjectives from those who favoured a social and
economic democracy (11). During the almost six years of the Alfonsín term, the
electoral variable occupied an unquestionable position in the Argentinian political
spectrum, achieving almost unparalleled successes, as was indicated in the first
point of this introduction. The high rate of voter participation, the regular repetition of
the electoral date, in keeping with the constitution, the absence of foul play, and the
recognition and acceptance of the final results by all involved, guaranteed the
impact of the electoral process on the Argentinian political system.
The 1983 elections would seem to have signaled the restoration of
democratic liberty and the recovery of fully open political competition, as had
happened ten years earlier. But it was in that very decade that there was to arise
massive electoral support for Raul Alfonsín, the presidential candidate for the UCR,
who was to lead en ethical opposition against the proposed "union-military" pact,
and who would also embody the old radical spirit of democratic recovery. The
punitive vote inflicted on the Peronist opposition, that all buit wiped out the
enormous electoral participation of the two 1973 elections, was swamped beneath a
completely unsatisfactory management of the economic crisis, subversive struggles,
countersubversive struggles of any political persuasion, and the inexistence of an
even minimally functional state. The Radical triumph was consolidated by obtaining
an absolute majority in the House of Deputies. For its part, the Justicialist party,
while still strong in the interior provinces, became the majority party in the Senate.
The 1985 elections for the renewal of half of the House of Deputies, saw
an increase in the percentage vote in favour of the UCR, and a, considerable
decrease in the vote for the Justicialist party (12), which found itself in complete
crisis and on the verge of disintegration.
In 1987, elections were held once more to renew the House of Deputies,
and to decide on the posts of Provincial Governor, whose term is of four years'
duration. The strength of the Peronist Renovador nominee was the most significant
event of the elections. The recovery of the Justicialist Party was evidenced
essentially by two events: the recovery of its traditional position as majority party (a
position occupied since 1946), which made the UCR lose its absolute majority in the
House of Deputies, and the upset of the heir of Alfonsínism, Juan Manuel Casella
by its candidate for governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Antonio Cafiero. The
former was supposed to have had an obstacle free path to the Casa Rosada. All
these took on an innovatory aspect, bearing in mind the character of the punitive
vote two years later against the unsuccessful Radical government, and the swing of
part of the right Radical vote in favour of the Unión de Centro Democrático.
The 1989 election, brought forward for electoralist reasons to May when it
could equally well have been set back to July (13), were for the partial renewal of
the provincial legislative houses, the renewal of half of the House of Deputies, and
for the election, in accordance with the indirect voting system of those.
II. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
1. Some Speculations
The Argentinian constitution of 1853, still intact, is heavily influenced by
the Constitution of the United States; this influence is noticeable most in the
adoption of the presidential style of government and in the indirect election of the
President (14). The Constitution regulates this election down to the last detail, and
its lack of revision has maintained this system intact throughout Argentinian political
history. The manner of the election of a President is dealt with in articles 81 and 85
of the Constitution. In these it is stated that "The capital and each of the provinces
will nominate by direct vote an assembly of representatives, equal in number to the
total of deputies and senators that represent them in Congress ... and who, once
gathered in their respective capitals, four months before the end of the presidential
term, will proceed to elect the President and Vice-President of the nation..."
There have been twenty one indirect elections in Argentina between 1854
and 1989 (As well as three presidential elections, in 1951 and twice in 1973, and
one vice-presidential election, that were decided by direct vote). For all apart from
these exceptions (and apart from the 1949 election under the Peronist constitution)
the same constitutional text has prevailed, but the electoral laws have changed
profoundly, distorting the original text. Initially it was designed in accordance with
the thinking of Alexander Hamilton, as a method "capable of avoiding the disorder
and tumult that a direct presidential election would provoke in a republic". Its
composers believed that a "prudent dispersion of the voters", gathered in small
groups, "would inspire in them a reasoned judgement for nominating with complete
autonomy the First Magistrate". Later, the development of the political parties
obliged all who would be President to serve some time first in political society before
attempting to enter the closely guarded inner precinct. The assemblies were, as a
consequence, a reflection of the diverse movements of opinion which, thanks to the
evolution towards universal suffrage, were turning the members of which they were
comprised into obligatory agents for any candidate; the system was working in such
a way that political society was articulated in two main options.
Finally, the linking of the elected positions to the different electoral laws
that were being introduced, produced, great inequality in the representation of the
electoral districts. The adoption of a proportional criterion in the electoral legislation
undermined the two party system, while the distortion of the number of
representatives corresponding to each district, assigning a minimum of fourteen,
doubled the originally stipulated figure in small provinces such as La Rioja, Chubut
and Santa Fe (15).
The preelection polls for the 1989 elections, together with other studies
(16), speculated on the possibility of none of the candidates achieving an absolute
majority in the electoral college, or, more precisely, that no candidate would achieve
"his own electoral college". By this, one is reminded that in the elections of 1868,
1916 and 1963, in which were elected Presidents Sarmiento, Yrigoyem and Illía,
there was no absolute majority in the assembly of voters, but that the remaining
seventeen elections decided by indirect vote had candidates with large majorities.
The inspection of the voting lists submitted by the assemblies of voters is
carried out by the Legislative Assembly, which is the combination of the House of
Deputies and the Senate. If no candidate receives an absolute majority, then
Congress, of whose members at least three quarters must be present, will decide
from "between the two candidates who have received the greatest number of
votes".
The possibility that none of the candidates of the majority parties would
have their own electoral college raised speculations, constructed under
parliamentary logic, of possible alliances between the candidates to achieve a
majority, for example between either the Justicialist party of the UCR, and the third
national party, the Unión de Centro Democrático,. comfortable in its pivotal position,
even though its own calculations could lead to an error in the consideration of the
relative importance of the district and political parties.
Similarly, there was speculation of a situation of grave consequences and
with little chance of solution: the possible blocking of any congressional action by
the absence of a parliamentary bench, which would prevent its quorum.
In any case, these were clearly ridiculous distortions of an indirect
electoral system, applied to circumstances much more complex than those of a
century earlier. The substantial weight of the vote of the scarcely Populated
provinces, and the very dynamics of a system that was not two party, introduced a
strong factor of instability into elections that were highly competitive in and of
themselves.
2. Candidates and Programs
The Argentinian party system has one variable that is not
uncommendable, which is the gestation of provincial and national parties. In a
presidential election, these newest parties take their number of votes to the national
formulas, although in the cases in which the provincial "particularismo" has a
marked influence, they propose their own candidates to the assembly of voters so
as, later and if necessary, to negotiate their vote in the electoral college.
In the May 1989 elections there were a total of ten national proposals (17)
and forty six provincial proposals. Not withstanding, the election focused almost
exclusively on the presidential candidates of the Justicialist party and the UCR,
Carlos Saúl Menem and Eduardo Angeloz respectively. Menem, with Eduardo
Duhalde -as running mate for the Vice-Presidency, was supported by the Frente
Justicialista de la Unidad Popular (18) and by the Partido Blanco de Jubilados, an
interest group that campaigned principally in Buenos Aires and in the federal
capital.
Both the UCR and the Confederación Federalista Independiente (CFI) (19)
lent their support to Eduardo Angeloz, although the former preferred Juan Manuel
Casella as a running mate, while the latter wished to see Cristina Guzmán in the
number two position.
On a more marginal level were candidates, Alvaro Alsogary of the Centrist
Alliance (20), Guillermo Estevez Boero of the United Socialist Alliance, Néstor
Vicente of the United Left Alliance, and Jorge Altamira of the Workers' Party. In the
event, Alvaro Alsogary received a considerably larger share of the vote than any
other of these lesser candidates.
Both Menem and Angeloz came to the elections with similar political
backgrounds; both were politicians from the interior, both had been elected
Governor (of La Rioja and Córdoba respectively) and neither of them was the
nominated leader of the party they represented. The differences in their electoral
manifestos were mainly of form rather than content. When the time came, therefore,
the assembly based its vote on two main considerations: the relative merits and
demerits of six years under a Radical administration, and the personalities of the
two party leaders, which had been clearly revealed during the course of the
election.
The FREJUPO centered its program around the somewhat confusing term
"productive revolution". This was understood intuitively by the lower and lower
middle class electorate who, hit hard by the crisis, opposed the speculative
economy" (capital) with the productive economy" (labour). Terminology aside, the
proposals were destined to respond on a more immediate level to the friction that
had existed under the radical government. In this way, it advocated the stable
maintenance of employment, the reconversion of public companies to companies
that would be "social property", the adjustment of minimum wage to the cost of the
"family food basket", and the absolute protection of the right to strike. Neither did
they suggest new criteria for dealing with the national debt: deeply frustrated by the
way in which the Alfonsín government had failed to handle this problem, the
Peronists considered that a drastic change to this would be to include Congress, so
that they could approve the negotiations. The foreign policy proposed by the
FREJUPO did not differ from that which had been previously maintained; it insisted
on the inclusion of Argentina in Latin America by way of regional integration, and on
the need to present the United Nations with a proposal for direct negotiations with
the United Kingdom over the sovereignty of the Falklands/Malvinas. Relations with
the Armed Forces were proposed along very different lines to those drawn by the
Radicals, and if there was no actual suggestion of an amnesty, there was
nonetheless talk of the need to reach a reconciliation with society, which, logically,
could not exclude the military sector. Finally, as far as political reform was
concerned, Menem showed himself to be in favour of reducing the presidential term
from six to four years, including in the Constitution the provision that no president
serve more than two terms.
The UCR proposals were based substantially on a continuation of the
policies that had been carried out prior to their election. These were notably: the
decreasing of the national deficit; privatization as a means to integral reforms of, the
State; democratization of labour relations, with the guarantee of democracy and
pluralism in the unions; the search for a political solution to the national debt; and no
concession of any amnesty to, or reconciliation for the sentenced military leaders.
In the face of the proposals formulated by the two majority parties was
launched the program of the Centrist Alliance, an absolute masterpiece of
neoliberalism of the "new right". The program demanded that the State withdraw
from all managerial regulations and interventions, and that it be reduced to carrying
out its primary functions of justice, foreign relations, defense, and internal security.
Capitalisation, and hence the reduction of the national debt, should be carried out
by the negotiation of activities within the State's control. With regards to foreign
policy, there was a proposed increase in the links with western democracies, and
the abandonment of Argentina's Non Alignment Movement. Finally, concerning
relations between the Armed Forces and civilian society, it was proposed that the
former wage war on subversion, but that other than in cases of proven crimes
against humanity, they rescind their convictions and suspend their trials. There was
also a proposal to reduce military service to three months.
The various left wing coalitions (the Izquierda Unida, Unidad Socialista
(21), and the Partido Obrero) emphasised in their programs the policies of
nationalisation, the role of the State in the search for a more equitable distribution of
income and resources, the unity of the organised workers' movement and the
strengthening of the unions, the unpaid national debt, an agrarian reform that would
make possible the expropriation of the latifunds, the support of integration into Latin
America, the continuation of the Non Alignment Movement, and finally, the
annulment of the laws of "punto final" and "obediencia debida".
3. On preelection polls.
Since the announcement of the presidential candidates in August of 1988,
the different polls taken up through to May 14th 1989 all had Menem as the most
likely victor. This affirmation, however, should be qualified by two observations: the
number of undecided was greater than 20% until two weeks before the election, and
the margin between the two candidates began decreasing in February and March of
1989 (22). Both of these might help us to understand how Menem's triumph was
secured definitively in the month preceding the election date, a date, we should
remember that was set by the government with an eye on the current political
climate.
The predictions most favourable to Angeloz were those of a poll taken on
April 24th, which concluded that the intended vote was 32.4% for Menem (which
would translate into 212 delegates)- and 31.8% for Angeloz (210 delegates), with-
22.7% undecided (131 unoccupied seats) (23). One week later, the predictions
were 38% for Menem, 32% for Angeloz, and 14% undecided (24). This meant that
the support for the UCR candidate found itself stabilising at its traditional third of the
vote, while the undecided were turning out in favour of the Peronist candidate.
4. The Election Campaign (25)
In considering elections in which both presidential and legislative contests
were being decided, At comes to mind that the electoral campaign was dominated
by two events of a different nature both institutionally and territorially.
However, an unusual incident of the period immediately preceding it
became a constant part of the election campaign. Union moderation extended
throughout the country, not only for the popular demobilisation that was put forward
by the Secretary of Social action of the CGT, Pedro Goyeneche, but by the social
agreement reached between the CGT and Argentina's Industrial Union of
employers, to postpone lay offs and suspensions until one month after the elections.
The effort was an attempt to create a peaceful social climate before the predictable
Peronist triumph, and to show the electorate how the Paronist party could better
govern due to its close relation with the unions.
Menem conducted an emotional campaign; his discourse was an
"antidiscourse", a reflection of a tense situation, and a rejection of any strictly
rational response. The speeches were spartan, with a brief and direct message that
reached quickly for certain sectors of-the public, and was not entirely devoid of
religious overtones: "Follow me, I will not betray you", and "God bless you all",
being repeated often. Once more he used his concept of "the people" with which he
had become permanently identified, and was the product of his conviction that he
had a majority because he had "the support of 'the people' and 'the people'
represent the majority". In this light, and given that the majority was already his,
Menem ceased his television campaigning weeks before election day. His small
screen absence was not to cost him a single vote, despite the fact that the UCR
publicity, approaching the matter rationally, upbraided his refusal to face Angeloz in
debate (26). Finally Menem, rather than focusing his campaign on large
conventions, created a caravan of supporters with himself at the head in a "Menem
Mobil". The purpose of this was three fold: firstly, he did not have to face the
statistical post mortems concerning the exact number present at his conventions,
since it was impossible to count the numbers that poured into the streets and waved
from their houses; secondly, he avoided the lengthy speeches that would not have
been avoidable at large, concentrated gatherings; finally, he sold the image created
previously by the Pope, of someone superior and distant, yet at the same time close
because he was in full view of everyone.
Angeloz carried out a completely different strategy, full of rationality,
speeches and ideological debate. Guided by the opinion polls, he focused his
campaign on gaining the female and the undecided vote, and tried unsuccessfully to
draw Menem into a televised debate. Inspite of having distanced himself from the
politics of Alfonsín, he once more took up the question of ethics, an approach that
was so necessary and effective in the 1983 elections, but that was of marginal
importance in such troubled times: "we may have made mistakes in economic
matters, but we left a country free from torture, free from bloodshed, and free from
deaths". In this sense the legacy of Alfonsín's political acts weighed heavily on the
Angeloz campaign, despite the fact that it closed with tremendous receptions in the
federal capital and Córdoba.
The UCeDé, whose success in the 1987 elections had made it an
authentic third party, tried to avoid at all costs the polarisation of the electorate, so
as to retain its position as a pivotal party. To this end it followed a course designed
to lessen the weight of the propaganda of the two majority parties, especially that of
the UCR, which insisted on the importance of the "useful vote". At the same time
the campaign was directed towards the search for a "new" space in Argentinian
politics, which it found, paradoxically, in political and economic liberalism, the
quintessence of politics two generations earlier. In any event, this was the party that
most clearly separated their presidential campaign from their legislative campaign.
As we shall see, they were more successful in the latter.
5. The Results
Once the voting for the members of the electoral assembly had taken
place, it was clear that constitutionalist concern over a possible institutional block
was misplaced, as Carlos Menem had received a comfortable majority which would
allow him his "own electoral college". Menem triumphed everywhere except the
federal capital, Córdoba, Salta and Chubut, where Angeloz was the winning
candidate. He managed to rebuild Peronism's historical political base, and came
close to achieving that mythical 50% of the electorate.
With respect to the 1983 elections, Peronism not only installed itself in
those districts in which they had traditionally counted on popular support, but also in
the previously hostile territory of Entre Rios, Mendoza, Rio Negro and Santa Fé,
among others.
Justicialism recovered its traditional domination in Buenos Aires, receiving
53.4% of the popular vote, as opposed to the 42.2% who supported Lúder in 1983.
At the same time, in the traditional Radical freehold of the federal capital, there were
even more surprising results: Angeloz and Menem were separated by only 8%
(45% and 37% respectively)' whereas in 1983 the difference between Alfonsín and
Lúder was 37% (64.3% and 27.3% respectively).
Menem not only remade the traditional Peronist bloc of support, but also
changed classic electoral behaviour; sectors which had never voted Peronist until
1983 chose his option (in a situation in which two party logic prevailed) as
retribution for the conduct of the outgoing President's government.
Even though numerous analyses during the electoral campaign indicated
that Angeloz lacked the complete support of President Alfonsín and of the UCR
itself, this fact, if fact it was, did not figure prominently in the electorate's thinking, or
at least not in the undecided Vote (whose preelection figure fluctuated between
25% and 30%), whose final decision was based on the fulfillment or unfulfillment of
their expectations for the previous government.
As has been mentioned above, the logic governing this type of election is
two party logic, or bipolarisation. It has been shown that in Argentina this is a
waning tendency; while in 1983, 91.9% of the electorate voted for one of the two
majority candidates, in 1989, even including the votes for parties with their own
representation but with previously declared alliance, this figure was down to 86.8%.
This slight tendency towards an increase in the number of non polarised votes could
be a new argument in favour of change in the electoral voting system, as there is
every indication that if this tendency continues the next presidential elections could
turn out to be a real institutional headache, and one that will be difficult to resolve.
With 37% of the vote, the Radical candidate received almost the same
percentage of the vote as the UCR in the 1987 legislative elections. Although it is
obvious that this percentage of the vote was not sufficient for him to be elected
President under a majority system, it was no less obvious that the governing party's
candidate did not provoke a decrease in his party's vote, although it was clear that
he was not going to increase it either, given the manifestly adverse political
situation, characterised by considerable attrition of support for the government.
There was a similar occurrence with the UCeDé candidate, whose figure
of 6%, despite optimistic predictions, improved only very slightly on the results of
1987. The Argentinian right barely grew in the federal capital, and only made real
headway in Buenos Aires and Mendoza, at the hands of the Democratic Party.
III. THE ELEC ION OF NATIONAL DEPUTIES
1. Disparities with respect to the presidential, election
Article 42 of the Constitution of the Argentine Nation establishes the
renewal of the House of Deputies "by halves every two years". After the democratic
transition of 1983, national legislative elections have been held in 1983, 1985 land
1987. Legislative elections were to have been held in 1989.
For these elections, Argentina is divided into 24 electoral districts, made
up of the twenty two provinces, the federal capital, and the territory of Tierra del
Fuego. The electoral law establishes the form of proportional representation for all
the districts, the system of closed and blocked lists, the division of the remainder by
the D'Hondt system, and a 3% threshold that all must pass to qualify for a share of
the seats.
Having elections that renew only half of one house produces a
"gradualism" effect in the political system, as it is free from the swift oscillations that
occur with some frequency in unstable political environments, and that can lead to a
complete replacement of the parliamentary elites.
In a political system as firmly presidential as the Argentinian one, when the
legislative and presidential elections coincide, the former take a back seat to the
latter. Nonetheless, the voter clearly understance the significance of both elections,
leading to a slight division in the voting, and producing certain peculiar effects on
the party system that we will examine later on. The different configuration of both
elections is emphasised by the fact that alliances forged in the presidential fire are
not maintained at a legislative level.
2. Candidates and results
Although the Justicialist success in the legislative elections of 1987 was
notable, it only translated into a loss for the radicals of the absolute majority in the
House of Deputies. Overall, the radicals continued to be the majority party. When
the electoral polls predicted victory for Menem, the strategy of the three major
parties centered on the acquisition or control of the majority in the House of
Deputies (27). For the Justicialist party, the question was one of shoring up their
presumed triumph in the presidential election with the control of the Legislative
Power. This would guarantee a period of at least two years during which they could
carry out their political designs free from any institutional block. The Radicals, on
the other hand, were fighting to prevent their loss from turning into an uproot, and to
prevent the peronists from gaining their hoped for absolute control. Similarly, the
"centrist right" of the UCeDé hoped to see itself in a pivotal position, so that no party
could gain a parliamentary majority without its support; in this sense we must see
the attacks by this party on the radicals as being much more virulent than those on
the Peronists.
As might have been expected, the pull exercised by the candidate
representing the opposition was the undoing of the Peronists in the House of
Deputies, as was Alfonsín's alliance in favour of the Radicals in the October
elections of 1983. The Peronists had sixty six seats, when there were only fifty three
deputies up for renewal (forty eight bona fide Peronists and five of the Intransigent
Party); the radicals lost twenty four seats; and the centrists gained four seats. The
absolute majority of the House, as it had in 1983 and 1985, passed into th6 hands
of a single party, although in this instance the party in question (the Peronists)
gained control of both the Executive power and the Legislative power.
The UCR, for the first time, ceased to be the majority party in the federal
capital, a position that was taken over by the FREJUPO. The Centrist Alliance, on
the other hand, despite not reaching their hoped for percentage, gained the largest
number of votes in their history, with 22%. At the head of their roster was Adelina de
Viola, who in the event lost his personal battle with Dante Caputo, number one on
the list of the UCR (28.4%). Both were surpassed by the FREJUPO roster, which,
with Miguel Angel Toma at its head, received 31.5% of the vote. Despite his loss in
the legislative battle for the capital, Adelina de Viola achieved one of the most
notable results of the elections: he bettered by more than ten points the percentage
received by Alvaro Alsogaray, the party's traditional leader and presidential
candidate.
In the province of Buenos Aires the composition of parties with
parliamentary representation differed in as much as it was in this district where was
the greatest instance of the integration of the Intransigent Party into the FREJUPO.
This had the effect of increasing the number Justicialist votes, and could lead in the
future to the disappearance of Oscar Alende's party, which was elected under the
trappings of Peronism. The centrist alliance improved thanks to the number of
radical votes translating into four seats, their best absolute result in any election.
The Unión Izquierdista and the White Partido Blanco de Jubilados, this latter of a
poujadist character close to Peronism, gained their only seats in Buenos Aires.'
The coinciding of an electoral district with a province, except in the
aforementioned cases of the capital and Tierra del Fuego, makes possible the
traditional apparition of provincial parties that can contend with the nationals for
seats in the government. In the presidential elections these parties generally either
decide not to present their own candidate, to the benefit of larger parties, or they
ally themselves previously with one of the majority parties.
In the May 1989 elections of the House of Deputies, the provincial parties
in Corrientes, Neuquén, San Juan and Santiago del Estero, each obtained one
seat, while Tucumán obtained two (see table IV). These provinces then aligned
themselves with those of Jujuy, Mendoza, Rio Negro and Salta, which already had
achieved national representation. Even with all that, the influence of the these
provincial representatives in the House of Deputies is minimal. To counter the effect
of their numerical weakness, the provincial parties align themselves with one of the
majority parties, either by simple integration (for example with the Corriente
Renovadora party of Santiago del Estero, integrated into the Justicialist group) or by
parliamentary cooperation (for example the coordination of the Pacto Autonomista
Liberal de Corrientes with the UCeDé).
3. The Split of the Vote
One of the most complicated interpretational problems that arises when
two different elections are carried out simultaneously is that of identifying the
behaviour of the voters in each, in other words how the votes are split between the
two. This frequent phenomenon, in which the voter identifies with widely different
interests depending on the elections, faces certain difficulties in Argentina. In effect,
the existence of only one ballot box, which includes the different candidates in the
same format, obliges the voter to execute a laborious series of cuts if he or she
wishes to vote differently in each election (28).
In the May 1989 elections, it was shown that the split of the vote, with its
manifest technical difficulty, was greater in those districts with a higher degree of
urbanisation, where there is supposedly a higher degree of political democratic
culture (table VII).
A comparative analysis of the electoral flow in the presidential and
legislative elections shows that the two majority parties tend to receive more votes
in the former than in the latter. This accentuates the concentration of the vote, and
hence the bipolarisation, of both elections.
The legislative elections, on the other hand, are almost genuinely
multi-party, with the majority parties losing votes relative to their percentages in the
presidential election. In this instance, the UCR lost twice as many votes as the
Peronists, in the capital, Buenos Aires and Córdoba. From this it could be inferred,
with more precise analysis of the electoral tables, that Peronism gains votes from
the left in the polarised presidential election, only to give them back in the legislative
ones. There is a similar relation between the UCR and the right. Taking only the
cases of the Capital and Buenos Aires, (table VI) we see that in the former the
Peronists and allied parties lose 5.1 percentage points in the presidential election
relative to the legislative election, while the left gains 4.8%. Similarly, the radical
coalition loses 9.6 points, while the right gains 9.7. 'n Buenos Aires the situation is
similar, though less marked: the Peronists lose 1.8 points and the left gains 2.6; the
Radicals lose 3.7 points and the right gains 3.1.
One of the unknown constants in Argentinian politics is the difficulty of
labeling the post 1946 parties as either "left" or "right". It could be maintained,
however, that apart from the volatile, or "turncoat" electorate, and as long as the
search is one for a useful vote with immediate results in the election, the left in 1989
has been inclined towards the Peronists, while the right has tended towards the
Radical vote. Not withstanding this hypothesis, only an .empirical study of the split
of the vote can lead us to definite conclusions, given that compensating for "cross
cuts" is technically possible (29).
IV. THE NEW POLITICAL SOLUTION
As opposed to the situation of six years ago, the problem facing Argentina
today is not the destabilisation of its democratic regime, but the strictly democratic
governing of its society. For any observer of the situation it must appear astonishing
that a political system characterised by its weakness should have survived the
absence of any real power for May to July of 1989 without trauma, and without
adverse forces bringing the system to the ground.
The indisputable figures for the current political situation show us that, as
in 1983, one party has gained control of the Executive power and part of the
Legislative power (the House of Deputies) for a period of six and at least two years,
respectively. However, in 1983 it was the UCR, whereas now it is the Justicialist
party that is in control. Moreover, today the majority party has complete control over
the Legislative power owing to its absolute majority in the Senate.
For the first time in Argentinian history, the clear majority party of the last
half century has replaced another democratically elected government, assuring a
correct variance in the political elite. When Peronism was voted into power in 1946
and 1973, the situation immediately preceding it was one of institutional breakdown
and authoritarianism marked by the presence of the Armed Forces. This partially
twisted the behaviour of the Justicialists, who came close to a dynamic of messianic
characteristics, trying to take up and represent all the strange values of the
Argentinian society of before. Its identification with popular and national values
generated a movement completely unlike that of any classical political party.
In 1989 the Argentinian political institutions found themselves working
again after six uninterrupted years in which the political norm had scaled heights
that would be difficult to f:ind in earlier times. The current analyses of the actions of
Raúl Alfonsín's government and of Alfonsínism as a theory and political praxis point
towards a thesis that might explain the failure of both as a ways and means of
decision making. Nonetheless, it seems clear that one immediately positive
consequence has been to give the opposition access to power via free elections,
while a negative effect has been to submerge the country in economic chaos
unprecedented even given Argentina's unfortunate tradition in this area (30).
With regards to the country's political direction, Carlos Menem's triumph
would seem to suggest the return to a style dominated by charisma rather than
rationality, a switch that had already been made in the internal Justicialist elections
of 9/7/88 (31). In this sense, Menem's success is quite unique; it could signal a
government in which all the union paraphenalia and the classic Justicialist
"leadership" are gradually substituted by different matters with characteristics
similar to those taking place in other countries in Latin America. The newly
civilianised right, separated from the possibility of direct military intervention, seems
to have access to an ever expanding power of legitimate decision making. From this
position, the pragmatist logic shows itself to be implacable, both in economic
matters, in which the means of carrying out their policies had a huge social cost,
and in strictly political affairs, where the plans for "national reconciliation" include
returning the corrupt and insubordinate military violators of human rights to the
barracks. Political reform will also be outlined from this view of the rationalisation
and modernisation of the political r6gime, possibly shortening the presidential term
to four years, but maintaining the system's presidentialist orientation.
This pragmatism exacerbates the underlying contradiction, that Menem's
election also implies, if he hopes to maintain both himself and the system, the
removal of the movementist characteristics in the political conduct that were present
in the Peronism of 1946 and 1973. In this instance the well oiled political system is
able to mold the charismatic leadership of the new president in such a way as to
avoid the possible, pernicious excesses of a strongly hegemonic and personalist
government.
The party system, which as the last elections show has continued its two
party tendency, plays a fundamental part in maintaining the definitive normalisation
of the political system. Nonetheless, it will not fulfill its role completely if variables
are not included in future political reforms, that determine effectively a new task in
the National Congress, until now weak and of little centrality (32). Finally, the UCR
should deal in the short term with at least two problems: self criticism of the form of
government that landed the country in its present situation; and the clarification of
its leadership. Even if Raúl Alfonsín does appear to many analysts to be chiefly
responsible for the current state of affairs, it is no less certain that there is no one
from among the ranks of the Radicals who could seriously question his leadership.
In political terms, the Argentinian transition finished some time ago: the
different democratically appropriate substitutions of the various governmental and
parliamentary elites at the national and provincial level have assured a correct
alternation of power, which permits talk of the consolidation of the system (33).
Curiously, now more than before there are socioeconomic circumstances that justify
a profound unrest in the, population without actually upsetting the relative stability of
the system. It would appear as though the "age of democracy" that is sweeping
through all Latin America has generated all the luck needed to project the new form
of government.
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